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Abstract
Using a model of cognition as extended and enactive, we examine the role of mate-
riality in making minds as exemplified by lithics and writing, forms associated with 
conceptual thought and meta-awareness of conceptual domains. We address ways in 
which brain functions may change in response to interactions with material forms, 
the attributes of material forms that may cause such change, and the spans of time 
required for neurofunctional reorganization. We also offer three hypotheses for inves-
tigating co-influence and change in cognition and material culture.
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Dolphins and bluefin tuna, as philosopher Andy Clark pointed out in 1997, 
have a greater-than-predicted swimming efficiency. They appear to realize this 
exceptional performance by exploiting the water’s kinetic energy, something 
they either sense in the oceanic currents or create themselves motorically 
(Clark, 1997). Clark’s fishy tale relates how an organism interacts with its en-
vironment: brain, body, and world are dynamically intertwined to a degree far 
beyond mere causal linkage. This may aptly describe the human adaptation 
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as well, though our analog is material culture. That is, for both sea creature 
speeding through water and ourselves maneuvering and manipulating the 
physical world, cognition is extended (i.e., materiality is constitutive of cogni-
tion, not just casually linked to it) and enactive (cognition is the transforma-
tive interaction between brain, body, and world). Characterizing cognition as 
a dynamically interacting system lets us consider the material as both agentive 
influence upon and partner to our psychological and behavioral capabilities 
and capacities (Malafouris, 2008, 2013).
Over time, interaction with material forms can change psychological pro-
cessing and behaviors. Here we examine two case studies in which this occurs: 
first, the emergence of literacy from the behavior of writing, which ultimately 
yielded meta-awareness of conceptual domains, and second, change in lithic 
technologies and associated behaviors that may index the emergence of con-
ceptual thought. We focus on behavioral and psychological change resulting 
from interactions with material forms (while we acknowledge the genetic, en-
vironmental, and selective components of evolution, our inquiry is not how 
brains make tools but rather how tools make minds). We ground our analyses 
of the archaeological record in neuroscientific understandings of brain form 
and function. We suggest that (1) change in material forms imply change in 
particular brain functions, (2) material attributes and properties cause such 
changes, and (3) such changes are experientially imperceptible. We conclude 
with three hypotheses for investigating co-influence and change in cognition 
and material culture.
The parallels between tunas exploiting the ocean’s kinetic energy and our 
own incorporation of material culture into our cognition may not be obvious. 
This is perhaps the result of the difference in dynamism, not in the organism–
environment interaction per se but in the environment itself, as water changes 
more immediately and perceptibly than do material objects under forces like 
invention, preference, wear, and age. Yet despite the seeming stasis of the ma-
terial realm, our interaction with it is no less dynamic – no less fluid – than that 
between fish and water: we too connect, exploit, and disconnect with the ma-
terial forms around us. Another reason the parallels are unobvious lies in the 
disparate temporalities of dynamic interactivity and accumulated change. The 
former is experienced in the moment; the latter takes years to millennia or lon-
ger to accumulate. The temporalities of change, which can span generations, 
tend to put it beyond our experience. Dynamic interactivity and accumulated 
change are not distinct, however, but connect and coalesce in the moment, 
where interactivity becomes collectivized and distributed within groups and 
societies. One of the mechanisms whereby this occurs is our use of materiality 
as a collaborative medium.
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As agent, partner, and collaborative medium, material artifacts interact with 
our psychological and physical abilities to pattern, habituate, and automate be-
haviors and skills, not only in individuals but in communities and societies as 
well. People who learn to drive or read and write become capable of manipu-
lating particular material forms with specific bodily movements (e.g., arms and 
eyes) and psychological functions (e.g., attention). Tool use may affect both per-
ception and body schema (Maravita, Husain, Clarke, & Driver, 2001; Maravita, 
Spence, Kennett, & Driver, 2002; Maravita & Iriki, 2004), and engagement of a 
material form can become so automatic that the tool is transparent in its use, 
enabling attention to be refocused on other goals (Charlton & Starkey, 2011; De 
Preester & Tsakiris, 2009; Tucha, Tucha, & Lange, 2008). Artifacts also help us 
decompose tasks and problems into smaller chunks (Hodder, 2012), which be-
come easier to solve, especially collaboratively: not only are smaller problems 
generally easier to solve than larger ones, but decomposition facilitates the re-
cruitment of potential problem solvers, and chunks can be distributed among 
individuals with different knowledge and skills (Hutchins, 1995). Artifacts also 
accumulate social and cultural knowledge in ways that mediate between what 
societies know and individuals learn (Haas, 1996) and which distribute cogni-
tive effort over space and time, increasing the knowledge and decreasing the 
effort required by any particular individual or generation (Hutchins, 1995). 
Thus, we do not reinvent navigation or numbers, but rather learn, apply, and 
extend knowledge encoded in devices like the compass and abacus.
Interaction with material forms can also repurpose existing brain functions, 
as for example, training the fusiform gyrus to recognize written objects, cultur-
al functionality that leverages an evolved role in recognizing physical objects 
(Dehaene et al., 2010; Dehaene & Cohen, 2007; McCandliss, Cohen, & Dehaene, 
2003). What may be overlooked in neuronal recycling, however, is that learning 
to read and write means acquiring the ability to interact with a material form 
that is capable of eliciting particular behavioral and psychological responses, 
capability developed and refined through centuries of collaborative, distrib-
uted use (Overmann, 2016, 2017). The developmental process additionally 
ensures that as the material form is refined toward increasing effectiveness, 
it remains synchronized to average behavioral and psychological capabilities 
(Overmann, 2017). Certainly, writing underwent significant change in form: 
in Mesopotamia, initial signs with approximate semantic values and little-
to-no phonetic specification became script capable of expressing the mean-
ings and sounds of specific languages with fidelity (Hyman, 2006; Overmann, 
2016; Sampson, 1999). While accumulating this change, writing nonetheless 
remained usable in common – requiring, in general, no unusual participant 
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capacities in psychological functions like working memory or physiological/
behavioral capabilities like hand–eye coordination – through and because of 
the collaborative, distributed nature of its use and refinement. In turn, change 
in material form represents physiological/behavioral change in the participat-
ing members of the society, change they realized by interacting with the mate-
rial form that in turn enabled them to change it further (Overmann, 2016). The 
iterative process of developing literacy and script from behaviors like hand-
writing and viewing conventionalized signs provides insight into ways that 
cognition and material culture can influence and change one another. It also 
raises intriguing possibilities for investigating co-influence and change in the 
more remote past.
1 Inferring Cognitive Change from the Material Record
Investigating the remote past is challenging, as neither cognition nor behavior 
can be directly observed or tested in extinct species. Skulls and endocranial 
casts provide insight into cerebral volume, gross morphology, and ontogenet-
ic development (Bruner, 2004, 2010; Hublin, Neubauer, & Gunz, 2015; Leigh, 
2005) but do not reveal much about interior (soft-tissue) structure or psycho-
logical functioning. One can observe and measure the neurological function 
and structure of closely related non-humans (Nieder, 2013; Orban et al., 2006), 
which helps in identifying hominin-specific abilities but does not reveal when 
such differences appeared or their evolutionary context. Behaviors in extant 
species can be compared to those of extinct species, with similarities and 
differences assessed for cognitive implications (Wynn, Hernandez-Aguilar, 
Marchant, & McGrew, 2011; Wynn & McGrew, 1989). For extinct species, be-
haviors and cognition can be inferred from the archaeological and fossil 
records, and the archaeological record attests material change. Such analyses 
are complicated, however, by the vagaries governing archaeological/osteologi-
cal preservation and discovery, the often-limited extent (how many related 
items) and duration (over what span of time) of samples, and various method-
ological and theoretical issues (Garofoli & Haidle, 2014; Wynn, 2002).
One such theoretical issue is a lingering Cartesian division of brains from 
material forms (Malafouris, 2013). As a consequence, human cognitive evo-
lution has been conceived as a story of brains becoming bigger and more 
capable over time (Bruner, Manzi, & Arsuaga, 2003; Herculano-Houzel, 2009; 
Herculano-Houzel, Manger, & Kaas, 2014; Kirk, 2006; Rightmire, 2004). As 
brains became bigger and more capable, behaviors and tools became more 
complex (Foley & Lahr, 1997; Shea, 2017), circumstances plausibly related 
(Hecht et al., 2015; Johnson-Frey, 2004; Orban & Caruana, 2014; Stout, Hecht, 
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Khreisheh, Bradley, & Chaminade, 2015; Stout, Toth, Schick, & Chaminade, 
2008). Typically, increasing complexity in behaviors is explained as bigger 
brains enabling greater flexibility; for tools, as bigger, smarter brains creating 
better tools (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Coolidge & Wynn, 2001; Donald, 
1991; Heldstab et al., 2016; Mithen, 1996). Better tools certainly enabled ances-
tral species to access food resources more efficiently (Leonard, 2002), yielding 
the improved nutrition that was a factor in releasing selective pressure against 
larger brains (Isler & Van Schaik, 2006).
If brains make tools, less well recognized is the potential for tools to influ-
ence behaviors and psychological processing (Malafouris, 2013; Fig. 1). This 
appears to have been the case with how literacy developed from handwrit-
ing, an interaction with a material form that yielded specific reorganizations 
and transformations to the human cognitive architecture (Overmann, 2016; 
Fig. 2). It could even be argued that behaviors with tools initialize processes 
of change, since they are demonstrated by species without language (Finn, 
Tregenza, & Norman, 2009; Hall & Schaller, 1964; Sanz, Call, & Morgan, 2009) 
and with minimal levels of socially learned behaviors (Laland & Janik, 2006), 
characteristics true of our own remoter ancestors. However, psychological– 
behavioral–material co-influence means that exact originating causes are 
often difficult to determine amidst multiple interacting variables, especially 
given the incompleteness and uncertainty of insight into events occurring in 
the remote past. Pinning down a prime mover is also perhaps unnecessary, 
since co-influence can be mutually reinforcing, and the resultant trajectories of 
change may have emergent effects that influence and intensify further change 
(Hodder, 2012; Overmann, 2015). One strategy, however, is starting from what 
Figure 1 In the “brains make tools” model (left), brains make tools that modify the  
environment, causing natural selection to act upon bodies, yielding the bigger, 
smarter brains that make better tools. In comparison, in the “tools make minds” 
model (right), behaviors with materiality change psychological processing in the 
brain, enabling new behaviors that yield changes in material forms.
Brains make tools Tools make minds
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our ancestors shared with contemporary species – which is making, using, and 
discarding tools as an implicit part of behaviors associated with things like ob-
taining food – and then asking how and why interactions with tools might have 
changed behaviors and psychological processing over time, as inferred from 
change in material forms.
2 Stone Tools, Distinctive Behaviors, and Cognitive Implications
The oldest artifacts able to inform scholarship about the evolution of hom-
inin cognition are stones and bones: tools made of stone and the attendant 
debris of their manufacture and use, including bits of bones with marks on 
them from tools or teeth. Stone tools were not likely to have been the only 
forms of material culture used by early hominins (early Homo, and possibly 
the Australopithecus), nor butchery their only application, but stones and 
bones are what preserve over millions of years, along with teeth. Nonetheless, 
stone tools provide a surprising amount of insight into human cognitive evo-
lution. The first, dating to between 2.6 and 3.3 million years ago (Ma), were 
sharp flakes produced by striking the edge of a stone “core” with a hammer 
stone (Harmand et al., 2015; Semaw, 2000). These tools appear to have been 
made, used, and discarded during processes of food extraction (e.g., butcher-
ing carcasses), behavior similar to that of modern non-human primates, who 
access sources of food with tools (e.g., rocks, twigs) created for the purpose and 
Figure 2 Two written characters from Mesopotamian writing separated by roughly 800 
years. The later sign (right) is less depictive than the earlier one (left). The 
change in material form and concomitant behaviors like handwriting suggest the 
fusiform gyrus was becoming able to recognize characters by their features and 
topological relations, relaxing the need for depictiveness. A detailed analysis of 
change in Mesopotamian written forms and behaviors is presented in Overmann 
(2016), Fig. 9. Images adapted from the Cuneiform Digital Library (2015) and 
Pennsylvania Sumerian Dictionary (2015).
Pictograph meaning head, person,  
or capital, ca. 3200 BC
Character for the Sumerian  
word SAĞ, ca. 2500 BC
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afterward discarded (Wynn et al., 2011; Wynn & McGrew, 1989). Like modern 
non-human primates, these early hominins do not appear to have separated 
tools from their processes of use.
By about 1.7 Ma, hominins (at this point, Homo erectus) manufactured tools, 
but also carried them from place to place, keeping them for future use, a be-
havior not demonstrated by today’s non-human primates. This curation sug-
gests that tools had acquired status as permanent objects of daily life, perhaps 
with an attendant ontological concept distinguishing them from other kinds 
of objects (Wynn & Gowlett, 2017). Hominins shaped some of their stone tools 
symmetrically, producing artifacts known as bifaces (Beyene et al., 2013; Diez-
Martín et al., 2015; Lepre et al., 2011; Wynn, 1989). Bifacial symmetry may have 
had its roots in the process of stone knapping (the conventional term for flak-
ing stone) itself. When a stone knapper strikes a large number of flakes from a 
core, searching each time for an optimal place to strike, the core slowly takes 
on an oblong, vaguely lenticular shape (Moore & Perston, 2016). Homo erectus 
began to accentuate certain ergonomic features of this oblong form in order 
to enhance its effectiveness as a large cutting tool: the tool’s heft at the base 
(“glob butt”), forward and lateral extensions, working edge support, and thick-
ness adjustment suggest their makers were attending to specific ergonomic 
features of the design (Gowlett, 2006; Fig. 3). In addition to ergonomic features, 
they also attended to visual features of the core itself, often accentuating the 
oblong form into a bilateral symmetry. In other words, hominins no longer 
made tools shaped just enough to get the job done (i.e., objects fitted to ex-
ternal purposes). Instead, they attended to design features and relationships 
within the form (objects whose internal features and relations were ends in 
themselves). Making these tools entailed sustained attention to their features 
(e.g., the glob butt and forward extension in relation to the whole artifact and 
to each other).
It was the engagement of earlier hominins with stone tools themselves that, 
arguably, acted as a scaffold for the development of a tool concept. Little of 
this interaction is visible in the archaeological record, but there are provoca-
tive hints. We know, for example, that even early on (i.e., before 3 Ma), homi-
nins selected high quality raw material (Harmand et al., 2015). By 2.3 Ma, the 
evidence indicates that knappers examined cores closely for optimal places 
to strike off flakes (Delagnes & Roche, 2005), and at about the same time, 
hominins carried cores, and occasionally finished flakes, long distances (up to 
13 km) (Braun, Plummer, Ferraro, Ditchfield, & Bishop, 2009). Close examina-
tion of cores implicates developments in attention, and carrying provided a 
temporal extension to tools and related activities to produce a curation in fact, 
if not yet in mind.
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Potential sequelae of these developments are with us still. Today we find 
the human intraparietal sulcus has non-homologous regions specialized 
for representing aspects of visual stimuli (Orban et al., 2006), the supramargin-
al gyrus is active when we use tools (Orban & Caruana, 2014), and the angular 
gyrus is recruited for both finger movements and mathematical tasks (Andres, 
Seron, & Olivier, 2007; Brooks, Barner, Frank, & Goldin-Meadow, 2014; Frank 
& Barner, 2012; Heimann, Umilta, & Gallese, 2013; Penner-Wilger et al., 2007; 
Roux, Boetto, Sacko, Chollet, & Trémoulet, 2003; Tschentscher, Hauk, Fischer, 
& Pulvermüller, 2012). The importance of such parietal functions to both tools 
and concepts is significant, given that parietal enlargement is the single char-
acteristic best differentiating the human brain from the brains of other pri-
mates, including ancestral species like H. erectus and closely related species 
Figure 3 Two handaxes separated by about 70 thousand years. The more recent artifact 
(right) is more symmetrical than the older one (left). The difference in material 
form and attendant behavior show that its maker paid attention to and expended 
effort toward realizing symmetry, implying cognitive change. Previously  
published as Fig. 2 in Overmann and Wynn (2018).
Handaxe from Kokiselei, Kenya, ca. 1.76 million 
years (Lepre et al., 2011)
Handaxe from Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania, ca. 
1.69 million years (Diez-Martín et al., 2015)
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like the Neandertals (Bruner, 2010; Bruner & Manzi, 2008; Bruner et al., 2003). 
Evidence that motor movements and conceptual thought are related is also 
found in the cerebellum, another potential difference between the brains of 
H. sapiens and Neandertals (Pearce, Stringer, & Dunbar, 2013; Weaver, 2005). 
Traditionally implicated in motor control and sequencing, the cerebellum ap-
pears to have a role in forming and manipulating abstract concepts as well 
(Balsters, Whelan, Robertson, & Ramnani, 2013; Koziol, Budding, & Chidekel, 
2010; Vandervert, 2009; Vandervert, Schimpf, & Liu, 2007), including those of 
numbers and mathematics (Vandervert, 2017).
The trajectory of change associated with stone tools suggests that the use 
of material objects as an implicit part of behaviors is not what differentiates 
humans, since this is shared with both ancestral and modern species. What 
may more truly distinguish us is us our ability to think about materiality – to 
form concepts of materiality in its absence, and to form concepts in seeming 
independence of any materiality – differences in behaviors and, plausibly, psy-
chological processing associated with the curated tools of Homo erectus. Today 
our neurons form and manipulate concepts as if our bodies were behaviorally 
engaged with physically present materials. That is, the neural muscles that en-
able us to think about material forms emerged, at least in part, through several 
million years of patient stone knapping by ancestral species.
3 Handwriting and Literacy
If stone tools actualized the ability to form and manipulate concepts mental-
ly, as if they were physical objects, writing might be said to have actualized 
the ability to form and manipulate concepts physically, as if they were men-
tal objects. Reading is the interaction of psychological processes like object- 
recognition and language (Adelman, Marquis, & Sabatos-DeVito, 2010; Perfetti, 
2003; Perfetti & Tan, 2013), material forms like words on a page, and behav-
iors like handwriting that interface the two. The material form is writing, and 
change in its form over time represents change in behaviors and brains. In the 
late 4th millennium BC, writing in Mesopotamia began as pictures; over some 
800 years, pictures turned into cuneiform (Krispijn, 2012; Nissen, Damerow, & 
Englund, 1993; Veldhuis, 2014), a script that – unlike pictures – cannot be read 
without training. Interpreting this particular change in material form through 
the neuroscience of literacy suggests the following: handwriting taught brains 
to recognize characters by combinations of their local and global features 
and to associate them with the meanings and sounds of language. These 
training effects influenced change in the material form: for example, feature 
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recognition relaxed the need for pictures to resemble the original objects, al-
lowing them to become less depictive over time (Overmann, 2016). Change in 
form, thus, implies change in psychological processing. Change in form also 
necessitated increasingly formalized training, creating specialized practitio-
ners like scribes, and this intensified behaviors and material–psychological 
change.
Across languages and scripts, core differences between literate and non- 
literate brains include feature-recognition in the fusiform gyrus (i.e., Visual 
Word Form Area), its interaction with language functions, and activity in 
Exner’s area (the frontal region adjacent to Broca’s and the primary motor con-
trol area implicated in the movements specific to handwriting) (Klein et al., 
2016; Pegado, Nakamura, & Hannagan, 2014; Roux et al., 2009). As the interface 
between the psychological and material dimensions of writing, handwriting 
was critical to the development of literacy. Today it is known to improve things 
like fine motor skills, hand–eye coordination, recognition and recall functions, 
and tolerance for ambiguity in how characters are formed (James & Engelhardt, 
2012; Longcamp, Zerbato-Poudou, & Velay, 2005; Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2014; 
Sülzenbrück, Hegele, Rinkenauer, & Heuer, 2011). In original contexts, hand-
writing would have provided a critical mechanism for adjusting and refining 
the material form of writing. Conditions in the late 4th millennium BC were 
perfect for this continual tinkering: Mesopotamia was a state-level bureaucra-
cy whose massive administrative requirements required generations to read 
and write the same signs with conventionalized meanings, hours per day and 
days over years. This interaction with the materiality of writing reorganized 
behaviors and brains, enabling further change to the material form. Within just 
a few centuries, the method of writing had become more efficient, as draw-
ing curved lines was replaced by making wedge-shaped impressions (a matter 
influenced by the clay used for writing surfaces) (Cammarosano, 2014). A few 
centuries later, as signs were becoming less depictive, wedge-making order was 
becoming standardized, automaticity that would have enhanced lexical recall 
(Bramanti, 2015; Giovanni, 1994; Taylor, 2015) and freed cognitive capacity in 
psychological processes like attention for other purposes.
While Mesopotamian literacy may not represent a universal developmental 
process, it shares with other original contexts a repertoire of simple, conven-
tionalized, non-numerical signs, written by hand for generations with the rep-
etition frequency demanded by a state-level bureaucracy (Overmann, 2016). 
By 2000 BC, some 1500 years after writing began, literacy in Mesopotamia is 
signaled by several phenomena (Overmann, 2016): characters for words were 
no longer being split between lines of text (Cooper, 1996, 2004), an increased 
integrity of form that implies feature-recognition effects. Cursive, script with 
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“abbreviated signs, crowded writing, and unclear sign boundaries” (Veldhuis, 
2011, p. 72) had developed, suggesting tolerance for ambiguity. Writing was 
being applied to many new purposes (Veldhuis, 2011, 2012), suggesting it had 
achieved significant expressive power, and training had become highly for-
malized (Veldhuis, 2014), suggesting that script was opaque without it. The 
amount and rate of change also decreased around this time, though character 
form would continue to simplify, suggesting additional effects on attentional 
resources. That is, in modern scripts, a greater density of local features appears 
useful for novices but unnecessary and perhaps even detrimental for proficient 
readers (Bird, 1999; Ravid & Haimowitz, 2006). Possibly the continued simpli-
fication of cuneiform characters after 2000 BC represents the discard of local 
features unneeded by proficient readers; this would likely have caused a con-
comitant increase in the effort required to acquire proficiency, at a time when, 
indeed, training was becoming more highly formalized.
4 Investigating Co-Influence and Change in Cognition and Material 
Culture
Lithics and writing raise three points for investigating co-influence and change 
in cognition and material culture. First, activity in Exner’s area is important 
not only to producing writing but to comprehending it as well (Anderson, 
Damásio, & Damásio, 1990), suggesting a neural muscle (Overmann & Wynn, 
2018). If indeed handwriting does become obsolete, as the encroachment of 
typing implies (Konnikova, 2014), Exner’s area may continue to support com-
prehension, preserving neural activation once related to a specific productive 
behavior (handwriting) and perhaps tangentially involved in related behavior 
(typing). Understanding these antecedents, we might then deem this a neural 
fossil (Overmann & Wynn, 2018). Activation continuity seems empirically veri-
fiable and might, if supported, suggest that some of the activation associated 
with higher-level cognitive functions (e.g., in the parietal lobes or cerebellum) 
may be neural fossils related to productive behavior with material forms no 
longer in use (e.g., stone tools) that continue to respond to related material 
forms and behaviors. This in turn implies the development of a generalized 
neurological response to material culture (Overmann & Wynn, 2018), a corol-
lary to the way concepts can become distributed over multiple material forms 
to become effectively independent of any of them (Overmann, 2019).
Second, literacy involves, as lithic production once did, sustained attention 
on the features of material artifacts (e.g., design features in stone tools; the 
local and global features of written characters). Neither consisted of a passive 
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visual inspection, but rather, motor movements that manipulate the material 
form concomitant with sustained attention to its features. Manipulation likely 
helped maintain interest, an element of sustaining attention, while habitu-
ation and then automation of the movements freed attentional capacity for 
purposes like attending to the content of writing and the patterns inherent 
in numerical sequences, rather than the mechanical production of characters 
and numbers. Sustained attention may be, therefore, an important mecha-
nism for co-influence and change in cognition and material culture. This in 
turn suggests that research into the mechanisms whereby attention is focused, 
sustained, and balanced between competing stimuli (as it appears to be in dia-
critic markings, as mentioned previously) may be fruitful in providing insight 
into co-influential processes.
Third, concepts have been modeled as enactive blends of mental and mate-
rial inputs, with the material component proposed to anchor and stabilize the 
resultant blends (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Hutchins, 2005; Malafouris, 2013). 
If this is correct, then it suggests a possible mechanism for the development 
of greater complexity in psychological processes like categorization (Christie 
& Gentner, 2007; Thompson & Oden, 2000). That is, increased focus on design 
features of stone tools implies the ability to subdivide material forms, whose 
anchoring and stabilizing effects may be relatable to the complex hierarchical 
categorization ability in humans relative to other primate species. Writing cer-
tainly enabled materially represented ideas (e.g., all the professions performed 
by members of Sumerian society; all the stars known to the Babylonian as-
tronomers) to be gathered, co-located (because they could be written together 
on the same clay tablet), manipulated (through the ability to reorganize them 
implied by rewriting and revising), and analyzed for their similarities and dif-
ferences, implying, minimally, that the written medium enabled conceptual 
categories to be sharpened (Veldhuis, 2014; Watson & Horowitz, 2011). Similarly, 
forming categories of relations (i.e., being able to ignore some features while 
attending to other, perhaps non-salient features) implies an ability to attend 
not just to wholes but also their parts, evoking ancestral concerns with the 
features of stone tools.
Granted, these hypotheses must be operationalized, highlighting the need 
for archaeology to engage the broad cognitive sciences. However, viewing cog-
nition as extended and enactive admits new ways of thinking about the role of 
material forms within it: the story of human cognitive evolution may be one in 
which material interactions have changed behaviors and brains, enabling tool 
users to make subsequent, further changes to material forms. The iterative co-
influence we suggest for lithics and writing implies the idea that brains make 
tools must be at least supplemented by the idea that tools can also make minds.
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